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The success of business in modern societydepends on not only the ethics of individual
executives and managers, but on the legal
framework that empowers and constrains the
corporation itself. For businesses to flourish in a
sustainable fashion, the legal infrastructure must
encourage the creation of wealth, while
simultaneously constraining the inevitable
excesses brought about by an unrelenting drive to
increase profits. The American and British legal
traditions address this tension between
empowerment and constraint by establishing
corporate law as the province of shareholder and
managerial prerogatives and leaving the regulation
of corporate excesses to ‘external’ regulation, such
as environmental law, employment law and the
like. The duties within company law are
straightforward — the managers should look after
the interests of the shareholders, and they need
concern themselves with the interests of other
stakeholders of the firm only when required to do
so by external law or when doing so is conducive
to shareholder interests. 
This bifurcation of interests — shareholder
interests are the concern of corporate governance,
while the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders are addressed elsewhere — is
increasingly under attack. Not only does the
parsing of interests seem artificial, but inefficient
as well. A growing number of business leaders,
scholars, and leaders of NGOs are calling for
changes in the legal framework to allow
corporations to create wealth while addressing the
concerns of all their stakeholders.
If company law were to be released from its
shareholder/management focus, what would it
look like? This article proposes five new principles
for company law. If adopted, these new principles
and proposals would provide the basis for positive
change in the way we govern corporations.
Principle One: The ultimate purpose
of corporations is to serve the
interests of society as a whole
Imagine a situation in which a corporation is
thriving economically, but that it spins off more
external costs than external benefits, so that
society as a whole is worse off. Such a situation
would be unsustainable and untenable. The
corporation’s prerogatives do not depend on any
natural or human right. Instead, the corporation is
a state-created entity whose purpose is to serve the
collective good, broadly defined, and if it ceases to
serve the collective good, it should not be allowed
to continue its operation, at least not in the same
way. If all corporations, or corporations of a
certain type, or even an individual corporation
created more social harm than good, no society
in its right mind would grant incorporation to
those firms.
Of course, both ‘social value’ and ‘social cost’
are difficult to define, but it is crucial to define
them broadly. Benefits include not only profit to
the shareholders but also workers’ earnings, the
stability a company brings to communities in
which it does business, the quality and
importance of the company’s products or services,
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and more. Costs include pollution, depletion of
scarce resources, harmful effects of the company’s
products or services, mistreatment of employees,
and even more abstract externalities such as the
company’s reinforcement of harmful stereotypes. 
Ultimately, we cannot assess the social value of
a company simply by looking at its financial
disclosures. We must know about the company’s
product or service, how it treats its workers, and
whether it is a good ‘citizen’ in the community.
Even though a company’s narrow-gauged financial
reports are often popularly cited as a measure of
the company’s worth, they of course do not come
close to reporting a business’s true value. Instead,
companies should be measured on more than
their finances — because externalities count, we
must try to count them. The type of broader
information about a company is important not
only to citizens interested in knowing the true
impact of a company, but also to the decision
makers within the company itself. 
Principle Two: Corporations are
distinctively able to contribute to
the societal good by creating
financial prosperity
One cannot go very far in a discussion about
guiding principles for the regulation of
corporations without noting what is special about
them: they are especially able to create financial
prosperity. They are able to do so because of a
number of characteristics: the easy transferability
of shares, limited liability, specialised and
centralised management, and a perpetual
existence separate from their shareholders. These
characteristics are creations of law. Society
establishes the framework of corporate law in
order to create the space in which large public
corporations can be one of the engines of wealth
creation in the economy. If they stop creating
wealth, they are failures.
Importantly, the wealth that matters includes
not only monetary gain by shareholders but also
gains to other stakeholders as well. We must also
include the value to employees of their jobs and
the social worth of the goods or services sold, as
well as the multiplier effect on other businesses
that provide raw materials, transport the end
product to market, or sell sandwiches to the
employees at lunchtime. 
We should also remember that, as social values
go, the creation of wealth is not at the top of the
hierarchy. Wealth is an instrumental value, not an
end in itself. This is not to say that money is
unimportant, but there are many things we
cherish that have little or nothing to do with how
monetarily valuable they are. We strive to end
racial injustice, even if such efforts cost us in
terms of financial wealth. We protect pristine
wilderness areas not because of their financial
value but because we enjoy walking in deep
forests, or value the idea that deep forests exist,
even if we never get to walk in them. We prohibit
companies from discriminating against potential
employees on the basis of their disability, even if
such disability is costly to accommodate. We
collectively value justice, fairness, equality, and
human rights even though it costs money and
resources to protect them.
All this is to say that corporations should be
appreciated for their special ability to create
wealth but should be treated warily because of
their inability (absent regulation) to take into
account values far more important than wealth.
We should be persistent in our monitoring of
corporations to make sure they are moving us in a
positive direction, given the form and powers we
have bestowed upon them. The ability to create
wealth is a very important power of corporations.
As any powerful force, it must be constrained and
regulated to ensure it does not careen out of
control. The guiding standards for this regulation
are the focus of Principle Three.
Principle Three: Company law should
further Principles One and Two 
This principle is simply the concept that law is
necessary to ensure the first two principles are
satisfied. If corporations are to serve the interests
of society (Principle One) and do so primarily by
creating wealth (Principle Two), we need to use
law to make sure those principles are met.
Corporations will not, through their own
generosity, internalise the external costs of their
decisions or keep an eye on the social harms they
produce. Ironically, we use law to grant
corporations the characteristics that make them
capable of generating profit, but we need to
constrain them using other areas of law and
regulation. 
The problem, however, is the fact that existing
company law routinely makes the simultaneous
generation of wealth and societal benefits less
likely, by requiring management to look after the
interests of shareholders first and foremost. If
management knowingly makes a decision that
benefits employees but imposes real, long-term
costs on shareholders, such a decision would
violate their duties to shareholders (under US law). 
Shareholder primacy is traditionally based on
three arguments:
1. Advancing shareholder wealth advances
societal wealth
2. Broadening managers’ responsibilities to
include other stakeholders in fact releases
them from any real responsibility
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3. It is more efficient to regulate corporations from
the outside than from the inside. 
Each of these claims can be answered.
The first claim is that we need not worry about
non-shareholder interests, since
looking after shareholders will
inevitably help other
stakeholders as well. At one
level, this claim is true. A
company that is losing money
is not much good to anyone
with any sort of investment in
the firm, whether that
investment be in the form of
labour, money, or
infrastructural support. But
beyond that, the claim
becomes much more tenuous
— the ‘trickle down’ is not
inevitable. Without a
mechanism within the
corporation to force it to
absorb externalities or to share
profits among all stakeholders,
there is no inevitable gain on
the part of workers or society
even when the company is
making lots of money. Indeed,
shareholder profit could result
from a transfer of wealth from
the company’s employees or
from society generally to the
shareholders. 
The second argument in favour of shareholder
primacy is that a broadening of corporate
responsibilities actually makes it easier for managers
to avoid individual responsibility. If corporate
managers have more than one ‘master’, they can
play masters off of one another, much like a child
might play parents off one another. 
This argument is overblown and dubious. There
is little reason to fear that managers cannot handle
increased responsibility or that it would be
impossible to know whether managers are doing
their jobs well. People routinely have more than one
responsibility, some of them even conflicting, and
we do not helplessly throw up our hands. Corporate
directors and managers, in actual practice, regularly
balance a number of obligations, some arising from
corporate law, some from other areas of law, and
some from the market itself. 
The only way that having more and broader
responsibilities would make it easier for managers to
avoid responsibility is that they could use one
obligation as a defence to a claim that they failed
meeting another. But this is not a function of the
number and scope of responsibilities but how they
are enforced, and corporate law duties are simply not
enforced in a way that would allow managers to
play one duty off the other. 
So the traditional contention that company law
should focus on shareholders alone reduces to the
third and final claim that it is more efficient
to regulate corporations from the ‘outside’
than from the ‘inside.’ This is simply an
empirical question: if we want to regulate
corporations to ensure they consider the
interests of non-shareholding stakeholders
but still allow them to generate wealth, are
we better off using corporate law along with
other regulatory mechanisms or just those
other mechanisms alone? Here, there is
reason to believe that corporate law is an
untapped resource with significant potential.
If more economic fairness is a social
objective, it is likely to be more efficient to
have that goal be included among the
corporation’s own objectives rather than
having government redistribute the wealth
after corporations create it. Also, corporate
managers may have expertise in areas that
government bureaucrats do not, and a
broadening of corporate responsibilities
would allow corporations and their
management to be proactive in addressing
issues of social concern, which in turn might
be more efficient than relying on the mostly
reactive power of government regulation.
Finally, progressive changes in corporate
governance would affect the corporation
wherever it does business, whereas
regulatory reforms largely stop at the state
or national border. 
Principle Four: A corporation’s wealth
should be shared fairly among those
who contribute to its creation
Corporations are collective enterprises — they
require a multitude of inputs, all of which are
essential to the creation of its wealth. The firm
needs financial capital, labour, infrastructure, and
depends on a social fabric of laws and norms that
create and sustain the marketplace and enable a
stable society in which the company can operate.
The collective nature of the firm should be
recognised through an equitable sharing of the
corporate surplus. 
There are two related arguments for such an
arrangement. First, corporate law should make fair
allocation of the corporate surplus the norm because
this would be better for firms over time. Many of
the stakeholders in the firm make firm-specific
‘investments’ — whether of capital or labor or
infrastructure — meaning that their contributions
are much more valuable in the particular firm than
they would be generally. Firm-specific investments
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are great assets for the firm because it can then
take advantage of and build on the knowledge and
expertise of their investors, suppliers, communities
and employees over time. The problem is that the
more an individual stakeholder makes investments
that are firm-specific, the greater the risk the
stakeholder is taking that the firm will collapse,
violate some implicit or explicit contract with the
stakeholder, or extort concessions from the
stakeholder. As the stakeholder becomes more
valuable to the company, he or she also becomes
more vulnerable. This risk makes the stakeholder
less willing to dedicate themselves to developing
the firm-specific ability in the first place. 
The answer to this dilemma is that a fair
allocation of the profit created by the firm will
help ensure that all stakeholders will be willing to
make firm-specific investments. Because
corporations are a collective effort, the key to
sustainability is for those who
contribute to the firm to receive
the benefits (or suffer the costs)
of the firm in rough proportion
to their contributions.
Stakeholders who believe they
receive a fair allocation of the
corporate surplus will be more
willing to ‘invest’ in the firm.
Over time, the firm will be more
successful if the various
stakeholders are willing to make
such investments.
Additionally, a fair allocation
of the corporate surplus will
inure to the benefit of the firm
over time because the various
stakeholders will be more
dedicated to the firm’s success.
Human beings are reciprocators
— we tend to treat others the
way that others treat us. Workers
who believe they are treated
fairly tend to work harder, be
more productive, obey firm rules
more often, and be more loyal to
their employers. This in turn
likely makes those firms more
profitable than they would have
been absent such fair treatment. 
Even if one is not convinced
that more parity among
stakeholders is better for firms
themselves, there is an additional reason to push
for a fair allocation of the corporate surplus.
When we take society’s interest as our ultimate
guidepost, society is not concerned exclusively
with the maximisation of aggregate wealth.
Rather, the fairness of the allocation of society’s
wealth is an important principle. As a society, we
look not only at the total social wealth, but at the
equality of its distribution.
Principle Five: Participatory,
democratic corporate governance is
the best way to ensure the
sustainable creation and equitable
distribution of corporate wealth 
A fair distribution of the corporate surplus is
essential, but allocative decisions are extremely
difficult, especially before the fact. So instead of
trying to reach agreements beforehand about
substantive fairness, corporate governance should
instead focus on procedural fairness. Because the
stakeholders cannot be expected to decide ahead
of time who should get what, they need to decide
instead how to decide who gets what. The crucial
objective of corporate governance, then, is to
create methods of decision making
that offer procedural fairness among
the various stakeholders.
The best way to do this would be
to require some mechanism for non-
shareholder stakeholders to elect their
own representatives to company
boards. The best way to have the board
make fair allocative decisions is to
have the important stakeholders
represented in the board room. The
specifics will be challenging but not
impossible: employees could elect a
proportion of the board; communities
in which the company employs a
significant percentage of the workforce
could be asked to propose a
representative for the board; long-term
business partners and creditors could
be represented as well. 
Again, the specifics do not matter
as much as the notion that the board
itself should be a place where more
than just a shareholder perspective will
be heard. As they participate on the
board, each stakeholder representative
will have the incentive to build and
maintain profitability in order to
sustain the company over time.
Moreover, the board will be the locus
of the real negotiations among the
various stakeholders about the
allocation of the corporate surplus.
Even though board members might be selected for
their positions in different ways and from
different constituencies, each would be held to
fiduciary duties to the firm as a whole. Decisions
that affect major stakeholders would no longer be
made lightly, without someone on the board
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being able to anticipate and articulate the likely
impact such a decision would have on the workers,
creditors, and other interested stakeholders.
One might argue that board pluralism would be
inefficient and unnecessary. But no constituency
would have an incentive to hurt the company in
order to gain a larger piece of the pie, and doing so
would violate their fiduciary duties to the firm as a
whole. A pluralistic board would actually retard
selfish impulses, because any behaviour that benefits
one stakeholder at the expense of the firm must be
done in full view of the others. 
Making the board less homogeneous may make
decisions less tidy, since more views will have to be
taken into account and since the board will be
forced to compromise so that decisions are
acceptable to a majority or plurality of stakeholders.
But we routinely consider such pluralism worth the
effort in other areas of our lives — we widely accept
the notion that decisions brought about after
dialogue and compromise are better than those
made unilaterally by a uniform group of individuals.
We recognise in legislative bodies, administrative
agencies, school faculties, and NGOs that diversity
of viewpoints and people increase the likelihood
that dissent will be welcomed, important
perspectives will be heard, and decisions will be
more fully vetted. As a matter of institutional
dynamics, more and more studies show that good
decision making requires diversity of viewpoints. 
These principles of good decision making are
not new. They are just systematically ignored in
corporate governance. The key contention is that
corporate boards — now among the most
homogeneous decision making groups in society —
would stand to benefit from a greater openness and
diversity. Such openness would not only make for
fairer decisions but better decisions as well. 
This article has been adapted from Kent Greenfield’s
book The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental
Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2006), published
by Chicago University Press.
Kent Greenfield can be contacted via email at
kent.greenfield@bc.edu. 
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